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Abstract.   International development assistance for health generates an emergent social 
network in which policy makers in recipient countries are connected to numerous bilateral 
and multilateral aid agencies and to other aid recipients. Ties in this global network are 
channels for the transmission of knowledge, norms and influence in addition to material 
resources, and policy makers in centrally situated governments receive information faster and 
are exposed to a more diverse range of sources and perspectives. Since diversity of 
perspectives improves problem-solving capacity, the structural position of aid-receiving 
governments in the health aid network can affect the health outcomes that those governments 
are able to attain. We apply a recently developed Social Network Analysis measure to health 
aid data for 1990-2010 to investigate the relationship between country centrality in the health 
aid network and improvements in child health. A generalized method of moments (GMM) 
analysis indicates that, controlling for the volume of health aid and other factors, higher 
centrality in the health aid network is associated with better child survival rates in a sample of 
110 low and middle income countries. 
Keywords: Development assistance for health; health policy; developing countries; Social 
Network Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
 
Development aid plays an important role in the health systems of many low and middle income 
countries. However, there is significant controversy over whether, when and how aid is 
effective in improving health outcomes (Martínez Álvarez & Acharya, 2012). In this article, 
we consider a neglected aspect of the debate: the fact that development aid constitutes an 
emergent social network connecting policy-makers of numerous governments, multilateral 
agencies and other large organizations (Han et al., 2012; Koenig-Archibugi, 2013). This global 
network is an emergent, unplanned structure because it evolved as a result of myriad individual 
aid allocation decisions driven by a variety of humanitarian, strategic, commercial, and political 
motives. Crucially, the global aid network is a social network. While flows of financial 
resources are an important dimension, network connections are by no means exhausted by 
them. Network links operate as a channel for a wide range of social processes, notably 
knowledge transmission, norm diffusion, social influence, and power. As such, they are likely 
to exercise significant influence on domestic health policy processes (Jones et al., 2017).  
Thinking of development aid as an emergent social network connecting health policy-
makers beyond national borders highlights a puzzle. Organizational research using the tools of 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) usually stresses the benefits of having many links to other 
actors: this condition is W\SLFDOO\ FDOOHG ³FHQWUDOLW\´ ZKLFK KDV positive or at least neutral 
connotations ± as ³EHLQJ LQ WKH WKLFN RI WKLQJV´ (Freeman, 1978, 219). This literature 
acknowledges the costs of maintaining network ties, but suggests that they are generally 
outweighed by the benefits. A recent survey of a large body of empirical research on knowledge 
WUDQVPLVVLRQLQVRFLDOQHWZRUNVFRQFOXGHVWKDW³>P@DQ\VWXGLHVDFURVVDOO OHYHOVKDYHIRXQG
that a central network position, defined either in terms of the number of direct contacts or both 
direct and indirect contacts, has a positive influence on knowledge creation, transfer, and 
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DGRSWLRQ´ (Phelps et al., 2012, 1138). An emerging literature on networks of health policy 
practitioners in domestic contexts also tends to stress the benefits that network connections can 
bring to performance (Blanchet & James, 2013; Blanchet et al., 2014; Browne et al., 2017; 
Gold et al., 2008; Jippes et al., 2010; Khosla et al., 2016; Merrill et al., 2010; Pagliccia et al., 
2010; Weishaar et al., 2015). 
The favourable assessment of high connectivity that pervades SNA-inspired research stands 
in stark contrast with the perceptions of most analysts and practitioners in the field of 
development aid, who tend to stress the disadvantages of the proliferation of ties between aid 
providers and aid recipients (Acharya et al., 2006). Even the word typically used to convey the 
fact that each aid recipient is linked to a variety of aid agencies ± ³IUDJPHQWDWLRQ´of aid ± has 
negative connotations. The most prominent indices and rankings of the quality of aid donors 
penalize them in direct proportion to their contribution to the proliferation of donor-recipient 
ties (Birdsall et al., 2010; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; Stephen Knack et al., 2011). 
Governments have repeatedly pledged to take steps to address the perceived problem. In the 
landmark Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, major players in official 
development assistance (ODA) stated WKDW³>H@[FHVVLYHIUDJPHQWDWLRQRIDLGDWJOREDOFRXQWU\
RUVHFWRUOHYHOLPSDLUVDLGHIIHFWLYHQHVV´DQGpromised to reduce it. 
The contrast between the perceptions of most development practitioners and analysts on the 
one hand and the insights of organizational research on the other hand is striking. It may partly 
reflect the fact that flows of development aid have not yet been examined from a social network 
perspective, leading to the neglect of important causal mechanisms (Blanchet & James, 2012; 
Schoen et al., 2014). This article fills this research gap by applying the substantive insights of 
the social network literature and recent additions to the SNA toolbox to the study of the global 
aid network. To our knowledge, it is the first article that does this. More specifically, the article 
develops and tests the hypothesis that the centrality of recipient countries in the international 
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health aid network is associated with better population health outcomes, specifically child 
survival rates. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section draws on sociological institutionalism 
and discusses the reasons why transnational connectivity can be expected to affect health 
policies and outcomes. The third section examines causal mechanisms involving specifically 
the health aid network, and develops the hypothesis that higher centrality of recipients in the 
international health aid network improves population health. The fourth section presents our 
methodology for measuring country centrality in the international health network, in which 
government officials in recipient countries are linked to multilateral and bilateral aid agencies 
directly and to other recipients indirectly through their aid providers. The second part of the 
fourth section presents the design of a statistical analysis of the effect of network centrality on 
child survival rates, based on 110 low and middle income countries from 1990 to 2010. 
Crucially, the analysis has to take into account the possibility of selection, whereby countries 
are more central due to unobserved conditions that are systematically related to child mortality. 
We fit a generalized method of moments (GMM) model to address the self-dependence in child 
mortality over time, the potential endogeneity of some independent variables, and country-
specific fixed effects. The fifth section presents our findings and the sixth section discusses 
them.  
 
2. Transnational connectivity and health outcomes 
An influential analytical tradition emphasizes the impact that transnational connections have 
on the principles, norms and knowledge that guide public policies and on the welfare outcomes 
that such policies are able to attain. A prominent tradition within sociological institutionalism, 
World Polity Theory, interprets state action as embedded in an overarching polity composed 
 5 
of governmental and non-governmental organizations that both constrain and enable action in 
a variety of domains (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer et al., 1997). While early proponents of 
:RUOG3ROLW\7KHRU\ VDZ WKH ZRUOG DV ³DXnitary social system, increasingly integrated by 
networks´Boli and Thomas 1997, 172), more recent work in this tradition has highlighted 
patterns of stratification and fragmentation in the world polity. Jason Beckfield, for instance, 
found that, since 1945, the network of intergovernmental organizations has become more 
IUDJPHQWHG PRUH KHWHURJHQHRXV OHVV FRKHVLYH DQG OHVV ³VPDOO-ZRUOGO\´ LQ LWV VWUXFWXUH
(Beckfield, 2010). 
 World Polity Theory thus encourages researchers to examine how transnational connections 
shape the norms and knowledge that guide policy making, and at the same time to be sensitive 
to variation in how and how much national actors are connected transnationally. This analytical 
tradition has generated a fruitful empirical research agenda, which has shown how stronger 
links to the world polity have beneficial effects on wellbeing measures in a variety of domains. 
John Shandra and his co-authors have shown that, in democratic countries, a stronger presence 
of health-focused international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are associated with 
lower infant mortality and HIV prevalence (Shandra et al., 2010; Shircliff & Shandra, 2011).  
Other authors have found that a stronger presence of child-rights INGOs are associated with 
higher state funding for education, reductions in child labor and increases in immunizations 
(Boyle & Kim, 2009; Kim & Boyle, 2012). Environmental INGOs are associated with lower 
deforestation and lower industrial organic water pollution in less developed countries 
(Jorgenson, 2009; Shandra et al., 2008). 
Participation in transnational networks creates channels of communication. But why would 
the extent of network centrality matter for policy content and outcomes? Specifically, why 
should it be related to an improvement of health outcomes, such as child survival rates? All 
else being equal, central actors are more likely to receive information that is transmitted 
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through the network. Centrality in transnational networks of health policy makers can be 
expected to result into faster access to more, richer and more diverse information relevant to 
health policy making. This expectation is in line with findings on the knowledge effects of 
network position in a range of interpersonal and interorganizational networks. As noted in the 
introduction, a recent survey of a large body of empirical research on knowledge transmission 
in social networks concludes that a central network position has a positive influence on 
knowledge creation, transfer, and adoption (Phelps et al., 2012).  
To be sure, more and faster information does not necessarily mean better information. Social 
network analysis cannot tell us by itself whether centrality leads to better decisions and better 
policy outcomes. But we have good reasons to expect that centrality may not only increase the 
quantity of information that is received, but also improve the quality of information that shapes 
the domestic policy process. Higher centrality typically entails connections to a more diverse 
range of actors, and diversity of information and perspectives is beneficial for the quality of 
decisions. A growing body of research shows that the problem-solving ability of groups is 
affected by their cognitive diversity, which can be conceptualized in terms of their individual 
PHPEHUV¶³SHUVSHFWLYHV´LHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIVROXWLRQVLQWKHDJHQW¶VLQWHUQDOODQJXDJHDQG
³KHXULVWLFV´ LH UXOHV IRU PDSSLQJ DQG VHDUFKLQJ IRU VROXWLRQV &ROOHFWLYH SUREOHP-solving 
capacity tends to increase with cognitive diversity (Hong & Page, 2004; Page, 2007; Stahl et 
al., 2009). This body of research provides valuable microfoundations for the macro-level 
associations highlighted by World Polity Theory.  
 
3. The health aid network and its consequences 
In the remainder of this article, we focus on connectivity through one particular kind of 
transnational linkages that, to our knowledge, have not been conceptualized in social network 
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terms yet: the network of officials connected through the provision of development assistance 
for health. First, we argue that the international aid network affects health policies by 
transmitting knowledge and norms in addition to material resources. Second, we argue that the 
structural position of countries in the network ± notably their network centrality ± affects health 
policy and health outcomes because it determines how fast and how deeply officials engage 
with new knowledge and new norms. Third, we argue that higher centrality in the international 
health aid network helps policy makers to attain better population health outcomes, because it 
exposes them to a more diverse range of information and perspectives.  
If international health aid constitutes a social network, what exactly do the network links 
convey and how does that affect outcomes? At one level, it is obvious what is conveyed: 
financial and other material resources, such as vaccines and medical equipment. Typically, 
links between donors and recipients of health aid are quantified in terms of monetary values, 
so we can say that, for instance, the development assistance for health (DAH) provided by the 
government of Denmark to the government of Togo amounted to $845,000 in 2010. We do not 
intend to discount the importance of the financial dimension of health aid. However, in this 
article we want to emphasize the social and cognitive dimensions of aid relationships. 
Crucially, in the empirical analysis presented below we identify the effect of aid links beyond 
the strictly financial dimension by including the volume of health aid per capita as a critical 
control variable in our statistical models.  
We expect that the effect of the non-material aspects of health aid links results mainly from 
the transmission of knowledge and norms, which we will also refer to as communication. There 
is a body of evidence indicating that aid-related communication among officials across borders 
is a major source of inputs in domestic health policy making and, especially in the case of states 
with little endogenous research capacity, it is often the main source of inputs (Okuonzi & 
Macrae, 1995; Parkhurst et al., 2010; Sumner & Harpham, 2008; Trostle et al., 1999). The self-
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perception of officials in agencies such as the World Bank is often as providers of knowledge 
(Barnes et al., 2016).  
What is being diffused through network communication varies considerably. In some cases, 
government officials have clearly defined policy goals but imperfect information about cause-
effect relationships. Communication in networks then provides officials with opportunities for 
³Bayesian´ learning, by which the addition of new data leads them to revise their probability 
estimates of the truth of various hypotheses on the effectiveness of alternative policies 
(Simmons et al., 2008, 28). An example of learning promoted by health aid relationships 
concerns the adoption of the drug misoprostol for the prevention of postpartum haemorrhage 
(PPH) in in low-income countries. The Gates Foundation funded a PPH program run by 
Gynuity Health Projects (GHP) and, through the latter, the Misoprostol for PPH in Low 
Resource Settings Initiative of the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, 
which promoted the use of misoprostol for PPH among policy makers and health care providers 
(Millard et al., 2015). In Uganda, international donors such as the aid agencies of USA, UK, 
Germany and the Netherlands funded NGOs that promoted the use of misoprostol and achieved 
its inclusion in treatment guidelines and national essential medicines list (Atukunda et al., 
2015). The example of misoprostol also illustrates a key fact: learning is not a straightforward 
applications of scientific evidence to public policy, but also a social and political process 
(Carey & Crammond, 2015). Between 2003 and 2011, GHP or other organizations made five 
applications to add misoprostol for XVHLQ33+WRWKH:+2¶V(VVHQWLDO0HGLFLQHV/LVW(0/
and before 2011 they were all rejected because of insufficient scientific evidence (Millard et 
al., 2015). The inclusion of misoprostol in the EML in 2011 did not settle the matter, as the 
evidence for the efficacy of misoprostol in community settings continues to be controversial 
and critics advocate the removal of the drug from the WHO EML (Chu et al., 2012; Millard et 
al., 2015). 
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In some cases, the goals of government officials are not predetermined and exogenous to 
the interaction with external actors, but developed through processes of persuasion or 
emulation. An example of successful norm promotion concerns the norms that health systems 
should specifically target maternal health and neonatal mortality (Shiffman & Smith, 2007; 
Shiffman & Sultana, 2013). To be sure, pointing at processes of norm diffusion through aid 
channels does not imply that global norm adoption is automatic or independent of domestic 
political circumstances, since JOREDOQRUPVFDQEHVLJQLILFDQWO\µJORFDOLVHG¶E\QDWLRQDODFWRUV 
(Brown, 2014). 
Communication within health aid networks influences the health policies that are 
implemented in a country in various ways. Most directly, the knowledge and values of officials 
in aid agencies are reflected in the development projects that they fund. More indirectly, they 
may influence the views of government officials in recipient countries, and in turn this affects 
what the latter demand in negotiations on projects funded by other donors. Officials in recipient 
governments may implement the policy interventions supported by aid agencies also in projects 
and programmes that are financed exclusively with national means. For instance, in Thailand 
pilot projects on Hepatitis B LPPXQL]DWLRQIXQGHGE\$XVWUDOLD¶VDLGDJHQF\were critical in 
persuading Ministry of Public Health officials to introduce nationwide immunization (Munira 
& Fritzen, 2007). Crucially, while recipient representatives interact directly with bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies, the latter are also channels for the transmission of knowledge and 
norms between aid recipients. Our social network perspective makes no assumptions on where 
innovations and evidence originate.  
In the previous section, we argued that what should matter for health outcomes is not simply 
the existence of connectivity, but a broader range of connections, i.e. higher centrality in 
transnational networks. This argument especially applies to the health aid network. This is for 
two complementary reasons. First, the relationship between aid agencies and aid recipients 
 10 
RIWHQGLVSOD\VKLHUDUFKLFDOIHDWXUHVHYHQZKHQLWLVSUHVHQWHGDVD³SDUWQHUVKLS´ (Aveling & 
Martin, 2013; Barnes et al., 2016). However, the simultaneous presence of many agencies may 
stimulate a competitive dynamic where aid agencies need to underpin their policy advice and 
prescriptions with more extensive and persuasive arguments and evidence, rather than 
expecting deference to authority.  
Second, a higher number of aid providers are likely to be more diverse than a smaller 
number. Diverse perspectives are transmitted through the health aid network. Diversity can be 
found at various levels, from general paradigmatic differences in the way health policies are 
conceptualized down to specific issues such as assessments of the comparative effectiveness 
of certain drugs or health technologies. One example must suffice for reasons of space. In the 
1990s, a so-called ³OLNH-PLQGHG´GRQRUJURXSFRQVLVWLQJLQLWLDOO\IRU1RUGLFFRXQWULHVDQGODWHU
H[WHQGLQJWRWKH1HWKHUODQGV6ZLW]HUODQGDQG&DQDGDQHJRWLDWHGZLWK0R]DPELTXH¶VPLQLVWU\
of health a sector-wide approach (SWAp), whereby health aid would be pooled and added to 
the government health budget rather than used for individual off-budget projects. The move 
towards pooled funding was resisted by the United States government, which was the largest 
single provider of health aid to Mozambique (and was labelled ³VLQJOH-PLQGHGGRQRU´by some 
observers) (Pfeiffer et al., 2017). The tension between the horizontal approach promoted by 
some donors and the vertical approach favoured by others was exacerbated by the massive 
influx of funding for HIV/AIDS activities flowing from the U.S. President's Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) from 2004. Contrary to the national HIV/AIDS plan developed by 
0R]DPELTXH¶V JRYHUQPHQW LQ FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH ³OLNH-PLQGHG GRQRUV´ ZKLFK VWUHVVHG
common fund support and purchase of generic drugs, PEPFAR's plan for Mozambique 
included the use of expensive brand-name drugs and the channelling of funding to U.S. NGOs 
for implementation (Pfeiffer et al., 2017). A compromise was agreed after a series of 
confrontational meetings. The example shows how there can be fundamental disagreements 
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between donors on the best way to organize and fund health services. The case of Mozambique 
is representative of a broader pattern.  For instance, in 2010 the United States devoted most of 
LWVKHDOWKDLGWR+,9$,'6PRVWRI'HQPDUN¶VKHDOWKDLGZDVGLUHFWHGWRZDUGVKHDOWh sector 
support, and the United Kingdom distributed its health aid relatively evenly between those two 
areas (our calculation based on data by Ravishankar et al., 2009). Global health policy since 
World War II is to a large extent characterized by disagreements over the relative merits of 
vertical and horizontal approaches (Hafner & Shiffman, 2013; Shiffman, 2006). Health aid 
donors have different priorities even within the same health focus area. For instance, in the area 
of maternal health there are systematic differences among three types of large donors - bilateral 
donors, foundations, and companies - in the way they distribute their funding among specific 
diseases, family planning services, capacity building and research (Deleye & Lang, 2014). 
Among bilateral donors, some tend to outsource the delivery of aid to nonstate actors, while 
other prefer to support state management of aid, and the difference is rooted in different 
national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in public service delivery (Dietrich, 
2016). 
While systematic research on the effects of perspectival diversity in health policy is still 
lacking, anecdotal evidence suggest positive effects. During the 1990s, the Cambodian 
government embarked on two major programmes: a large-scale donor-funded tuberculosis 
programme and a major donor-supported general re-organization of its general health services. 
The two programmes reflected different perspectives on how to achieve substantial 
improvements in population health outcomes. When the perspectives of the two programmes 
where combined, notably by expanding the coverage of the WHO-VSRQVRUHG ³directly 
observed treatment, short-FRXUVH´ approach to tuberculosis (a key pillar of the first perspective) 
in the context of a shift from hospital-based delivery to health-centre delivery (a key pillar of 
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the second perspective), Cambodia made significant progress in reducing tuberculosis 
incidence (Hill & Tan Eang, 2007). 
While maintaining network ties with other actor can bring benefits, it also entails costs. For 
this reason, the arguments developed so far are compatible with the detrimental effects that are 
emphasised by most of WKHOLWHUDWXUHRQ³DLGIUDJPHQWDWLRQ´,QWHUDFWLQJZLWKDODUJHUQXPEHU
of aid agencies may involve more effort towards the negotiation of the agreements (ex ante 
transaction costs) and more cumbersome reporting obligations (ex post transaction costs). 
Meeting numerous separate donor missions is time-consuming and, since donor reporting 
requirements are seldom standardized, bureaucracies in recipient countries spend a 
considerable amount of time in learning how to comply with the various requirements as well 
as retrieving and presenting the requested information (World Bank, 2003). Dispersing aid 
across multiple recipients tends to raise the administrative cost of donors as well (Anderson, 
2012). Moreover, scholars have argued that the more aid is fragmented, the larger the potential 
for harmful practices such as underfinancing government budgets, poaching managers, lax 
financial management, and aid tying (Acharya et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2009; see also the 
discussion in  Han & Koenig-Archibugi, 2015; S. Knack & Rahman, 2007; Stephen Knack & 
Smets, 2012). 
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the benefits of centrality in the health aid 
network outweigh the costs, or vice versa. As a contribution to answering this question, the 
remainder of this article will provide a quantitative test of the following hypothesis: Higher 
centrality of recipients in the international health aid network improves population health.  
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4. Methods  
4.1. Measuring centrality in the global health aid network 
We test the hypothesis on 110 low and middle income countries, as classified by the World 
Bank, with populations of more than 1 million, since countries with smaller populations present 
significant missing data problems on the independent variables. Our dataset covers the period 
1990-2010. Web-Appendix 1 presents the list of countries and years covered.  
Ideally, we would measure connections through the health aid network by counting and 
perhaps weighing episodes of communicative interaction between officials in provider and 
recipient agencies. Gathering this information for a large number of countries over time would 
be prohibitively costly, and perhaps unfeasible for other reasons as well. We use as proxy the 
existence of monetary flows of aid. We address the limitations of this proxy in two ways. First, 
as detailed below we develop a procedure for making alternative assumptions about the 
relationship between the volume of aid and the quantity/quality of information transmission. 
As we will see, our findings are robust to these alternative assumptions.  Second, we include 
the volume of health aid per capita as a critical control variable in our statistical models, which 
gives us confidence that our results capture the effect of aid links beyond the strictly financial 
dimension.  
Our analysis of the health aid network is based on data on flows of development aid for 
health (DAH) for the period between 1990 and 2010 collected by the Institute of Health Metrics 
and Evaluation (IHME) (Ravishankar et al., 2009). The IHME dataset covers 22 bilateral aid 
agencies, 11 multilateral agencies and two large private organizations (the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation and the Bloomberg Foundation). Two features make the IHME dataset 
particularly useful for our purposes. First, the IHME has been careful to avoid double-counting: 
if a donor provides aid through a multilateral agency, only the flow of resources from the 
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agency to the recipient is recorded in the dataset. This meets our needs because the nature of 
the network effects hypothesized in the previous section means that we are interested above all 
in the interaction between recipients and the immediate provider of aid, rather than the ultimate 
source of the funds. Second, the IHME dataset records disbursements rather than commitments 
of DAH, which is preferable for our purposes because most network effects discussed above 
are conditional on projects and programmes being in place rather than merely proposed. 
$PRQJWKHYDULRXVFRQFHSWVSURSRVHGLQ61$WRFDSWXUHFHQWUDOLW\³FORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\´
has the best fit with our argument. It is defined as the inverted sum of distances to all other 
nodes in a network from the focal node. In other words, it indicates how quickly a node can 
reach, and be reached from, all the other nodes in a network (Freeman, 1978). We focus on 
closeness centrality because of the possibility that interactions occur in the following sequence: 
a norm or knowledge on the effectiveness of health policies is generated in a low or middle 
income country, then the norm or knowledge is incorporated in the development policies and 
practices of one or more of its aid providers, then these aid providers transmit that norm or 
knowledge to other aid recipients, and so forth. To the extent that ideas can diffuse through the 
health aid network through multiple paths, it is useful to take into account the total distance 
between an actor and all other actors in the health aid network, i.e. not only those that provide 
direct aid to the focal actor, but also other aid recipients, and the agencies providing aid to those 
recipients, and so on. Closeness centrality reveals patterns of connectivity that cannot be 
captured through the measures commonly used in the aid fragmentation literature, such as the 
Herfindal index, which only consider direct ties (Acharya et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2009; 
Han & Koenig-Archibugi, 2015; S. Knack & Rahman, 2007; Stephen Knack & Smets, 2012).   
The global health aid network is a weighted network, i.e. we have information not only on 
whether a link exists between two actors, but also on the ³intensity´ of that link. In the dataset 
we use, the intensity is expressed in terms of financial resources ± the value in U.S. dollars of 
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the aid provided by donor A to recipient B in year X. Since we want to be able to use 
information on the intensity of links, to calculate closeness centrality we use a measure recently 
developed by Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz (Opsahl et al., 2010). Web-Appendix 2 
discusses their approach in detail and provides illustrations relating to aid flows. In short, the 
measure allows us specify the relative importance of degree and node strength in determining 
centrality. The degree of a node is the number of adjacent nodes or ties that the focal node has, 
and captures the dispersion of involvement. The strength of a node is the sum of the tie weights 
from the focal node to other nodes, and captures the absolute level of involvement. The measure 
for closeness centrality developed by Opsahl et al. is defined as follows: 
1
),()(

»¼
º«¬
ª ¦N
j
WW
C jidiC DD  
where d is the shortest distance between node i and j, w is the weighted adjacency matrix (in 
which wij is greater than 0 if the node i is connected to node j, and the value represents the 
weight of the tie), and Į is a tuning parameter. There are two benchmark values for the tuning 
parameter: 0 and 1. If the parameter is set to 0, the outcome is solely based on the number of 
ties. In other words, tie weights are completely ignored. Conversely, if the value of the 
parameter is 1, the outcome is based on tie weights only. This implies that the number of ties 
is disregarded.  
The tuning parameter needs to be set on the basis of theoretical and substantive 
considerations. In the following, we state the assumptions that correspond to different 
values/regions of the parameter in relation to the domain of health aid. 
x Setting Į = 0 reflects the assumption that centrality depends on the number of aid 
providers but not on the total value of health aid received. This assumption is plausible 
if interaction with an aid provider is sufficient to expose recipients to new knowledge 
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about health policy effectiveness, irrespective of the financial value of that SURYLGHU¶V 
aid.  
x Setting  0 < Į <1 reflects the assumption that aid flows of larger economic value involve 
more opportunities for interaction between representatives of aid agencies and 
recipients at various stages and phases of the policy-making process, and therefore more 
opportunities for communication and commitment effects to develop.  
x Setting Į= 1 reflects the assumption that centrality depends entirely on total aid flows, 
with the number of aid providers playing no role. This assumption is problematic in the 
light of the argument developed in the previous section. There are good reasons to 
expect that officials in recipient countries are exposed to more information and 
perspectives when they interact with a larger number of aid providers, even when 
keeping the sum of aid inflows constant. First, aid agencies are bureaucracies where the 
diversity of perspectives may be suppressed by a range of mechanisms, such as 
hierarchical direction, conformism, or career incentives. Second, recipients may not 
gain insight into the full range of diverse perspectives to be found in the aid agency, 
EHFDXVH WKH ODWWHU DLPVDWSUHVHQWLQJD VLQJOH ³RIILFLDO´SRVLWLRQ LQ LWVGHDOLQJVZLWK
recipients. Hence, a plurality of aid providers should be seen as an essential component 
of a conception of centrality suitable to the health aid field, and ignoring tie numbers 
by setting the tuning parameter at 1 would be theoretically inappropriate. 
For these reasons, below we test the effect of centrality when it is measured with reference to 
WKHQXPEHURIWLHVRQO\Į DQGZKHQLQFRUSRUDWHERWKGHJUHHDQGQRGHVWUHQJWKĮ
ZLWK Į  WR EH XVHG DV D IRFDO YDOXH LQ WKH VWDWLVWLFDO DQDO\VLV EXW QRW ZLWK Whe tuning 
parameter set at the value of 1.  
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Web-Appendix 3 uses this measure to show how the whole health aid network evolved 
between 1990 and 2010.  
 
4.2. Estimating the impact of centrality on child health 
We choose child survival as our indicator of health outcomes because it has been shown to be 
a good proxy for general population health (Reidpath & Allotey, 2003), because the coverage 
and quality of the data is higher than for other health indicators, and because of its substantive 
importance in national and global public policy. To measure child (under-5) mortality rates, 
we use the dataset compiled by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) 
(Rajaratnam et al., 2010). 
In addition to the centrality measures explained above, our models include health aid per 
capita as crucial control variable, as our hypotheses posit an effect of centrality that goes 
beyond the effect of the volume of health aid received by a country in relation to its population 
size. We include in our estimation other control variables that according to the literature may 
have an effect on health outcomes in general and more specifically on child survival. We 
include GDP per capita, as the level of economic development is likely to influence the private 
and public resources that can be invested in health care, and moreover it is often considered a 
proxy for general state capacity (Mishra & Newhouse, 2009). A second control variable is trade 
as percentage of GDP, which we treat as an indicator of economic globalization. We include 
this measure because economic interactions across borders could generate spill-overs of 
knowledge relevant to health policies and practices (Owen & Wu, 2007). Including a measure 
of globalization also increases our confidence that our health aid network centrality measure 
does not simply capture a couQWU\¶Vgeneral level of connectivity with the rest of the world. A 
third control variable is urbanization, as it can be easier to provide health services to a 
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population concentrated in urban areas than to a population more widely dispersed in rural 
areas. Our data captures urban population as percentage of total population. A fourth control 
variable is the type of political regime, since competitive democratic processes could result in 
public policies that are favourable to deprived sectors of the population, such as broader health 
care coverage (Ciccone et al., 2014; Krueger et al., 2015; Ross, 2006). We use the Polity2 
variable from Polity IV dataset, which measures democratic and authoritarian features of 
regimes on the basis of measures that capture modes of executive recruitment, constraints on 
executive authority, and political competition. A fifth control variable captures political 
violence in a country, either internal or international, since violence could contribute to 
mortality either directly or indirectly by weakening public health systems (Kerridge et al., 
2012). We do not include certain control variables, notably domestic health spending per 
capita, physicians per capita and years of schooling of women of reproductive age, because 
numerous missing values would reduce the number of observations drastically. Descriptive 
statistics and correlations are presented in Web-Appendix 4, which also presents the results of 
multicollinearity tests indicating that multicollinearity does not unduly affect our analysis. We 
use the logarithm of all dependent and independent variables in the estimations, except political 
violence and the Polity2 score, which are changed into dummy measures. Web-Appendix 5 
explains these choices and discusses the implications. Data on GDP per capita, population and 
trade as a % of GDP are from http://databank.worldbank.org.  Polity IV and major political 
violence data are from http://www.systemicpeace.org. Following the Polity IV codebook, we 
define partial democracy and full democracy as having a Polity2 score between +1 and +6 and 
between +7 and +10 respectively. The coefficients reported below refer to the effect of partial 
democracy and full democracy compared to the baseline category of autocracy (a negative or 
zero Polity2 score). To capture political violenceZHXVHWKHYDULDEOH³DFWRWDO´IURPWKH0DMRU
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV2012) database, which measures the intensity of both 
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interstate and intrastate violence. Countries with scores larger than zero are classified as 
suffering from political violence. We also incorporated year dummies to account for 
unobservable factors that might globally affect our health outcome of interest in a given year. 
Our analysis has to address the problem of selection effects (Martínez Álvarez & Acharya, 
2012). It is possible that donors are more likely to be present in, and/or channel more resources 
to, countries where child mortality is highest, for instance if they are responsive to need. Or 
donors may be more likely to be present in, and/or channel more resources to, countries where 
child mortality has declined faster in recent times, for instance if they wish to claim political 
credit for improvements of child survival rates. Therefore, we expect potential reverse causality 
between child mortality and a set of independent variables, such as centrality, aid per capita, 
and GDP per capita. We fit a two-step robust generalized method of moments (Difference 
GMM) model to examine our hypothesis. Our choice of estimation approach is explained and 
justified in Web-Appendix 6.  
 
5. Findings 
Table 1 presents the results of models that instrument with one lag (lag 2), which keep the 
number of instruments below the number of countries. In line with our hypothesis, closeness 
centrality has a negative and statistically significant effect on child mortality both when 
centrality depends only on tie number (Į DQGZKHQWLHQXPEHUDQGWLHZHLJKWVDUHgiven 
equal consideration Į  
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Table 1. Estimated effect of closeness centrality in the health aid network on under-5 mortality, 
1990±2010. GMM models instrumenting with one lag (lag 2). 
 
(1) (2) 
   
CloVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  -0.006*** 
 
 
(0.002) 
 &ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
 
-0.004** 
  
(0.002) 
GDP per capita -0.145*** -0.114*** 
 
(0.044) (0.034) 
Health aid per capita -0.010 -0.007 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Trade (as % of GDP) -0.021 -0.019 
 
(0.023) (0.022) 
Urbanisation 0.045 0.052 
 
(0.050) (0.039) 
Partial democracy -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Full democracy -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Political violence 0.005** 0.005* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Lag 1 of under-5 mortality 0.611*** 0.684*** 
 
(0.174) (0.159) 
Lag 2 of under-5 mortality 0.188 0.173 
 
(0.156) (0.151) 
   
Country-specific fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of observations 1,743 1,743 
No. of groups 102 102 
No. of instruments 95 95 
AR(1) -1.260 -1.340 
AR(1) p value 0.208 0.180 
AR(2) 0.342 0.506 
AR(2) p value 0.733 0.613 
Hansen stat 76.25 64.92 
Hansen p value 0.205 0.549 
 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The Web-Appendices report several robustness checks and additional analyses. First, we find 
that our results hold when we replace the closeness centrality measure with a simpler measure 
of centrality (degree centrality) that considers only direct ties with aid providers and disregards 
indirect ties (Web-Appendix 7). Second, we find that re-estimating each model using two lags 
(lag 2 and 3) produces results that are consistent with those in Table 1 (Web-Appendix 8). The 
robustness of the findings across the two instrumentation choices increases our confidence in 
them. Third, we considered the possibility that the benefits of network connections may be 
moderated by the capacities of recipient governments (Beesley et al., 2011; Lang, 2014). We 
find that the effect of network centrality is not conditional on measures of state capacity (Web-
Appendix 9). Finally, we find that the beneficial effect of network centrality persists if 
disbursements for health sector program support are subtracted from the total flows of health 
aid (Web-Appendix 10). This suggests that the effect of centrality does not depend on 
coordination among aid providers. 
 
6. Discussion 
Researchers have noted that, GHVSLWH WKH FRVWV HQWDLOHG E\ DLG ³IUDJPHQWDWLRQ´ officials in 
developing countries are sometimes uninterested in, or even critical towards, efforts to reduce 
the number of aid providers, even if the volume of aid were not affected (Greenhill et al., 2013; 
Pallas et al., 2015). Our findings may contribute to explain this. We argued that ties in the 
health aid network are channels of the transmission of policy-relevant knowledge, ideas and 
norms in addition to material resources. More central governments receive health policy 
information faster and, more importantly, are exposed to a more diverse range of sources and 
perspectives originating from both donor and other recipient countries, something that can help 
them select the policies that are likely to be more effective and resist pressure to adopt 
uncorroborated policies.  
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We also found that, when health aid network centrality is taken into account, health aid per 
capita does not have a significant effect on child mortality. This suggests that the knowledge 
and norms transmitted through aid links are on the whole more beneficial than the mere transfer 
of financial and material resources, also considering health spending from domestic sources 
tends to decrease in response to inflows of health aid (Liang & Mirelman, 2014; Lu et al., 2010; 
Martínez Álvarez et al., 2016). Separating the ideational and the financial dimensions of health 
aid, as we tried to do here, may also help account for the mixed findings yielded by previous 
research on the impact of health aid. While some studies found that higher amounts of health 
aid lead to lower infant mortality rates (Chauvet et al., 2013; Mishra & Newhouse, 2009), 
others found no statistically significant effect (Mukherjee & Kizhakethalackal, 2013; 
Williamson, 2008; Wilson, 2011). Two studies (Dietrich, 2011; Feeny & Ouattara, 2013) find 
a positive link between health aid and two measures of child health promotion: immunization 
against measles and immunization against diphtheria±pertussis±tetanus. (It should be noted 
that, in contrast to our analysis, all these studies examine the effect of committed aid rather than 
disbursed aid.) 
Two limitations of our analysis should be noted. First, we relied on monetary flows of aid 
as proxy for interaction between officials. While we developed two strategies for addressing 
the potential problems this could create ± we checked robustness to alternative assumptions on 
the relationship between volume of aid and quantity/quality of information transmission, and 
we controlled for health aid per capita to account for the narrowly material effects of aid ± the 
nature of the proxy should be kept in mind. Second, we could not include certain control 
variables because of severe missing data problems for the period we have network data for. We 
hope that this limitation can be overcome in future research thanks to improvements in data 
availability.  
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 While this article¶V DLPV DUH SULPDULO\ DQDO\WLFDO RXU ILQGLQJV yield some policy 
implications. Most directly, they suggest that the worry that there is too ³aid fragmentation´ 
and ³duplication of effort´ in the development aid system, which is widespread among policy-
makers and motivated initiatives such as the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 
2008 Accra Agenda for Action, may be unwarranted, at least in the area of health aid. There is 
no doubt that having to maintain links with a multiplicity of donors involves costs, but they 
appear to be outweighed by the positive effects of network centrality. If our findings are 
confirmed by further research, then efforts to improve the effectiveness of development aid for 
health may be better directed towards other areas of reform.  
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Web-Appendix 1. Aid recipients included in the analysis 
 
Table A1. Aid recipients included in the child mortality models and number of years for each 
country.  
  
  
      
Country Years   Country  Years 
Afghanistan 21 
 
Lebanon 21 
Albania 21 
 
Lesotho 21 
Algeria 21 
 
Liberia 21 
Angola 21 
 
Libya 21 
Argentina 21 
 
Macedonia 17 
Armenia 19 
 
Madagascar 21 
Azerbaijan 19 
 
Malawi 21 
Bangladesh 21 
 
Malaysia 21 
Belarus 19 
 
Mali 21 
Benin 21 
 
Mauritania 21 
Bolivia 21 
 
Mauritius 21 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 18 
 
Mexico 21 
Botswana 21 
 
Moldova 19 
Brazil 21 
 
Mongolia 21 
Bulgaria 21 
 
Morocco 21 
Burkina Faso 21 
 
Mozambique 21 
Burundi 21 
 
Myanmar 21 
Cambodia 21 
 
Namibia 21 
Cameroon 21 
 
Nepal 21 
Central African Republic 21 
 
Nicaragua 21 
Chad 21 
 
Niger 21 
China 21 
 
Nigeria 21 
Colombia 21 
 
Pakistan 21 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 21 
 
Panama 21 
Congo, Rep. 21 
 
Papua New Guinea 21 
Costa Rica 21 
 
Paraguay 21 
Cote d'Ivoire 21 
 
Peru 21 
Cuba 21 
 
Philippines 21 
Dominican Republic 21 
 
Romania 21 
Ecuador 21 
 
Rwanda 21 
Egypt 21 
 
Senegal 21 
El Salvador 21 
 
Serbia 17 
Eritrea 17 
 
Sierra Leone 21 
Ethiopia 21 
 
Somalia 21 
Gabon 21 
 
South Africa 21 
Gambia 21 
 
Sri Lanka 21 
Georgia 19 
 
Sudan 21 
Ghana 21 
 
Swaziland 21 
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Guatemala 21 
 
Syria 21 
Guinea 21 
 
Tajikistan 19 
Guinea-Bissau 21 
 
Tanzania 21 
Haiti 21 
 
Thailand 21 
Honduras 21 
 
Timor-Leste 12 
Hungary 21 
 
Togo 21 
India 21 
 
Tunisia 21 
Indonesia 21 
 
Turkey 21 
Iran 21 
 
Turkmenistan 19 
Iraq 21 
 
Uganda 21 
Jamaica 21 
 
Ukraine 19 
Jordan 21 
 
Uzbekistan 19 
Kazakhstan 19 
 
Venezuela 21 
Kenya 21 
 
Vietnam 21 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 21 
 
Yemen 21 
Kyrgyzstan 19 
 
Zambia 21 
Laos 21   Zimbabwe 21 
 
Web-Appendix 2. Measuring centrality in the health aid network 
 
As noted in the main text, the global health aid network is a weighted network, i.e. we have 
information not only on whether a link exists between two actors, but also on the ³intensity´ 
of that link. In the dataset we use, the intensity is expressed in terms of financial resources ± 
the value in U.S. dollars of the aid provided by donor A to recipient B in year X.1 There are 
various approaches to measuring centrality in weighted networks. One approach consists in 
disregarding weights and treating all ties as binary: either existing or non-existing. This 
approach has serious drawbacks whenever the intensity of ties conveys important information 
that should be taken into account. An alternative approach to measuring centrality consists in 
disregarding the number of ties and calculating centrality with reference to the sum of the 
                                                 
1
 In calculating the centrality measures explained below from the dyad-year dataset, we have assigned a centrality 
score of zero to country-years for which no health aid inflows were recorded (and to one country-year in which 
the net inflow has a negative sign). 
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weights attached to all ties. When the number of ties is an important dimension of a researcher¶V
understanding of centrality, this approach also leads to a loss of crucial information. 
The paper applies the framework proposed by Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz, which 
incorporates those two approaches as special cases and allows researchers to specify the 
relative importance of degree and node strength in determining centrality.2 The degree of a 
node is the number of adjacent nodes or ties that the focal node has, and captures the dispersion 
of involvement. The strength of a node is the sum of the tie weights from the focal node to 
other nodes, and captures the absolute level of involvement. Opsahl et al. develop measures for 
degree centrality, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality. While in the main text we 
apply the closeness centrality measure, here we consider degree centrality first as it is a simpler 
concept. The measure for degree centrality developed by Opsahl et al. is defined as follows: 
D
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where ik LVWKHIRFDOQRGH¶VGHJUHH is  LVWKHIRFDOQRGH¶VQRGHVWUHQJWKDQGĮ is the tuning 
parameter. There are two benchmark values for the tuning parameter: 0 and 1. If the parameter 
is set to 0, the outcome is solely based on the number of ties, and it is equal to the degree in a 
binary version of a network where all the ties with a weight greater than 0 are set to present. In 
other words, tie weights are completely ignored. Conversely, if the value of the parameter is 1, 
the outcome is based on tie weights only. This implies that the number of ties is disregarded.  
The tuning parameter needs to be set on the basis of theoretical and substantive 
considerations. In the following, we state the assumptions that correspond to different 
values/regions of the parameter in relation to the domain of health aid. Setting Į = 0 reflects 
                                                 
2
 Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz (2010). 
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the assumption that centrality depends on the number of donors but not on the total value of 
health aid received (assumption A). Setting  0 < Į <1 reflects the assumption that aid flows of 
larger economic value involve more opportunities for interaction between representatives of 
donors and recipients at various stages and phases of the policy-making process, and therefore 
more opportunities for communication and commitment effects to develop (assumption B). 
Setting Į= 1 reflects the assumption that centrality depends entirely on total aid flows, with 
the number of donors playing no role (assumption C).  
We have explained in the main text why we regard assumptions A and B plausible, and 
assumption C implausible. In the following, we illustrate the implications of the different 
assumptions by comparing two economically and demographically similar countries, Eritrea 
and Togo in 2010. As Figure A1 shows, Togo had links with a larger number of health aid 
donors compared to Eritrea. However, Eritrea received a larger total volume of health aid from 
its donors, largely thanks to large flows from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria.  
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Figure A1. Health aid ego networks of Eritrea and Togo, 2010. 
 
Note: The width of a tie corresponds to the value (in U.S. dollars) of development assistance provided by donors 
to Eritrea or Togo.  
 
 
Table A2 shows that Eritrea and Togo have similar levels of degree centrality ( WDC ) when both 
breadth and depth of ties are assumed to play a role Į %\FRQWUDVW7RJRKDVKLJKHU
degree centrality than Eritrea if we assume that centrality depends only on the number of donors 
(Į = 0). Under the opposite assumption that only total health aid matters for centrality (Į = 1), 
Eritrea is more central than Togo.3 
 
                                                 
3
 The numerical values of centrality at Į = 1 are high because they coincide with the total quantity of U.S. dollars 
disbursed to each country.   
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Table A2 Comparison of Centrality Scores for Eritrea and Togo, 2010 
 
   Eritrea Togo 
  0 9 16 
Degree centrality W
DC ZKHQĮ  0.5 20973 21100 
  1 48875949 27827117 
  0 95 102 
Closeness centrality W
CC ZKHQĮ  0.5 228 193 
  1 244 161 
 
 
Degree centrality is the simplest measure of centrality, as it considers only the connections 
between the focal node and other actors, but not the connections between those other actors. 
³Closeness centrality´ is a more complex concept, which is related to the idea of reach. It is 
defined as the inverted sum of distances to all other nodes in a network from the focal node. In 
other words, it indicates how quickly a node can reach, and be reached from, all the other nodes 
in a network.4 We explained in the main text why closeness centrality is particularly suited to 
capture the mechanisms we are interested in. To the extent that norms knowledge can diffuse 
through the health aid network through multiple paths, it can be useful to take into account the 
total distance between an actor and all other actors in the health aid network, i.e. not only those 
that provide direct aid to the focal actor, but also other aid recipients, and the donors to those 
recipients, and so on. When networks are weighted, traditional measures of closeness centrality 
suffer from the same problem of information loss that affects degree centrality. We address 
that problem by employing the procedure for weighted networks developed by Opsahl et al.5 
In tKHLU DSSURDFK WLH VWUHQJWK FDQ HLWKHU EH LJQRUHG Į    or taken into account on the 
DVVXPSWLRQWKDWVWURQJHUWLHVFRQVWLWXWHVKRUWHUSDWKVĮ!$VLQWKHFDVHRIGHJUHHFHQWUDOLW\
                                                 
4
 Freeman (1978). 
5
 Opsahl et al. (2010). 
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the choice of the value of the tuning parameter depends on whether a correlation between 
exposure to communication and monetary value of aid is assumed. The measure for closeness 
centrality developed by Opsahl et al. is defined as follows: 
1
),()(

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º«¬
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C jidiC DD  
where d is the shortest distance between node i and j, w is the weighted adjacency matrix (in 
which wij is greater than 0 if the node i is connected to node j, and the value represents the 
weight of the tie), and Į is the tuning parameter.  
To illustrate, we can consider again the cases of Eritrea and Togo in 2010. Figure A2 shows 
graphically the percentage of nodes to which the countries have direct links and those to which 
they are connected indirectly through one or more intermediaries. Eritrea has direct links (one 
step) to about 5 per cent of the nodes in the health aid network, whereas Togo has direct links 
to nearly 10 per cent of the nodes. Both countries can reach over 80 per cent of all nodes in two 
steps or less, over 90 per cent of nodes in three steps or less, and 100 per cent of nodes in four 
steps or less. The lower section of table 1 shows how the closeness centrality scores ( WCC ) of 
the two countries compare under different assumptions about the relative importance of breadth 
and depth of ties. If tie depth is ignored (Į = 0), Togo has a slightly higher level of closeness 
centrality than Eritrea. If tie depth is thought to matter for centrality (Į > 0), Eritrea is 
substantially more central than Togo. 
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)LJXUH$(ULWUHD¶VDQG7RJR¶VGLVWDQFHIURPRWKHUQRGHVLQWKHKHDOWKDLGQHWZRUN 
 
 Nodes reachable in one step 
 Nodes reachable in two steps 
 Nodes reachable in three steps 
 Nodes reachable in four steps 
 
 
Web-Appendix 3. Evolution of the health aid network, 1990-2010 
 
We can use the measures discussed in Web-Appendix 2 to trace the evolution of the health aid 
network as a whole over time. The average degree centrality and closeness centrality of the 
nodes provides a measure of the density of the network.  Figures A3 and A4 show the average 
centrality of the sample of low and middle income countries analysed in the main text, using 
four measures of centrality: degree centrality with Į DQGĮ DQGFORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLty 
with Į DQGĮ The figures indicate that between 1990 and 2010 the overall density of 
the network has increased substantially, regardless of whether it is measured only through 
direct links or also indirect links, and whether more intense connections are weighted 
differently from less intense connections or not. 
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Figure A3. Degree centrality by year, average of 110 low and middle income countries, 1990-
2010. 
 
 
Figure A4. Closeness centrality by year, average of 110 low and middle income countries, 
1990-2010. 
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Web-Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics and multicollinearity 
diagnostics 
 
 
Table A3. Descriptive statistics (variables before transformation). 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Under-5 mortality 2264 78.92 60.10 4.30 300.20 
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į=0) 2264 9.72 6.19 0 27.00 
Degree centrality (Į=0.5) 2264 19618.02 21310.43 0 139839.90 
Closeness centrality (Į=0) 2264 86.19 22.46 0 112.33 
Closeness centrality (Į=0.5) 2264 140.05 68.80 0 391.63 
GDP per capita 2142 1817.23 1899.38 50.04 11533.82 
Health aid per capita 2165 3.33 5.74 0 124.41 
Trade as % of GDP 2133 74.37 37.21 0.31 220.41 
Urbanisation 2264 44.56 19.84 5.42 93.31 
Polity2 score 2201 1.39 6.25 -10 10 
Major political violence 2248 0.95 1.92 0 13 
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Table A4. Correlation matrix (variables after transformation). 
  
Degree 
centrality  
(Į =0) 
Degree 
centrality  
(Į =0.5) 
Closeness 
centrality  
(Į =0) 
Closeness 
centrality  
(Į =0.5) 
Under-5 
mortality 
GDP per 
capita 
Health aid 
per capita 
Trade as % 
of GDP 
Urban-
isation 
Polity2  
score 
Political 
violence  
Degree centrality (Į =0) 1 
          
 
Degree centrality (Į =0.5) 0.87 1 
         
 
Closeness centrality (Į =0) 0.70 0.91 1 
        
 
Closeness centrality (Į =0.5) 0.79 0.98 0.93 1 
       
 
Under-5 mortality 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.21 1 
      
 
GDP per capita -0.35 -0.24 -0.16 -0.20 -0.74 1 
     
 
Health aid per capita 0.55 0.51 0.36 0.49 0.23 -0.18 1 
    
 
Trade as % of GDP -0.19 -0.21 -0.11 -0.15 -0.29 0.25 0.15 1 
   
 
Urbanisation -0.31 -0.24 -0.16 -0.18 -0.58 0.76 -0.17 0.18 1 
  
 
Polity2 score 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.36 0.37 0.13 0.06 0.31 1 
 
 
Political violence 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.22 -0.19 -0.21 -0.28 -0.22 -0.07 1  
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Table A5. Multicollinearity tests (variables after transformation). 
         
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
         
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  1.71 0.59 
      
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  
  
1.55 0.64 
    
&ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
    
1.21 0.83 
  
&ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
      
1.43 0.70 
GDP per capita 2.66 0.38 2.63 0.38 2.63 0.38 2.63 0.38 
Health aid per capita 1.74 0.58 1.68 0.59 1.40 0.71 1.62 0.62 
Trade (as % of GDP) 1.23 0.81 1.26 0.79 1.19 0.84 1.22 0.82 
Urbanisation 2.42 0.41 2.42 0.41 2.42 0.41 2.41 0.41 
Polity2 score 1.24 0.81 1.24 0.81 1.25 0.80 1.24 0.81 
Political violence 1.20 0.83 1.20 0.83 1.19 0.84 1.20 0.84 
         
Mean VIF 1.74   1.71   1.61   1.68   
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Web-Appendix 5. Logarithmic transformation of variables 
 
We use the logarithm of all dependent and independent variables (except political violence and 
the Polity2 score) in the estimations. This is for three reasons. First, we are examining low and 
middle income countries and these variables are more likely to be skewed. Second, some 
variables have large absolute values (e.g. GDP pc and centrality scores), and taking logarithm 
can effectively bring down the ranges of these variables and therefore reduce the sizes of their 
coefficients. Third, taking the logarithm facilitates interpretation, as the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticity, i.e. 1% increase/decrease in the independent variable will lead to x% 
increase/decrease in the outcome. This interpretation is particularly convenient for centrality 
scores, as they do not have a natural unit. We did not take the logarithm for the Polity2 score 
and political violence because they are discrete variables and they are less likely to follow a 
normal distribution. Instead, we changed them into dummy variables to facilitate interpretation 
(e.g. York, Rosa, & Dietz, 2003).6 As noted in the text, we followed the convention stated in 
the Polity IV codebook and defined partial democracy and full democracy as having a Polity2 
score between +1 and +6 and between +7 and +10 respectively. The coefficients reported in 
the article and in these Web-Appendices refer to the effect of partial democracy and full 
democracy compared to the baseline category of autocracy (a negative or zero Polity2 score). 
We classify a country as suffering from political violence if it has a score larger than zero in 
the YDULDEOH³DFWRWDO´IURPWKH0DMRU(SLVRGHVRI3ROLWLFDO9LROHQFH0(39GDWDEDVH. 
To assess the implications of our decision, we plotted the distribution of our variables to 
show their original distriEXWLRQ DQG ORJJHG GLVWULEXWLRQ 8VLQJ WKH µJODGGHU¶ FRPPDQG LQ
                                                 
6
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this. 
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STATA, the variable of interest is transformed in 8 different ways and a graph is generated 
showing the distributions of the original variables and 8 transformations (the graphs are 
available upon request). We find that taking the logarithm worked well for under-5 mortality, 
GDP pc, trade, degree centrality (alpha = 0.5). It improved the distribution for health aid pc, 
and it did not worsen the distribution of the other variables.  
 
Web-Appendix 6. The estimation strategy  
 
The paper uses a two-step robust generalized method of moments (Difference GMM) model to 
examine our hypothesis. We utilise this estimation strategy to address 1) the self-dependence 
in child mortality over time; 2) the potential endogeneity of some independent variables; 3) 
country-specific fixed effects; and 4) possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
error terms.7  Moreover, the Windmeijer finite-sample correction is also made by specifying a 
robust covariance matrix in the two-step estimation.8 We estimate the short-term impact of all 
independent variables by using their one-year lags (except political violence and year 
dummies) in the equation. This is also an effective way of reducing their endogeneity to the 
system. As one-year lagged centrality, GDP per capita, health aid per capita  and the interaction 
terms among them (used in the additional analysis) are likely to be predetermined, we 
instrument them using their own lags starting from the second. The impact of network centrality 
and other influential factors over the longer term is captured by including two lags of child 
mortality into the model. Therefore, current mortality is explained not only by the independent 
variables at t-1, but also those values at t-2 and t-3 as reflected by the dynamics of child 
                                                 
7
 Arellano and Bond (1991); Roodman (2009). 
8
 Roodman (2009). 
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mortality itself. This lag length achieves the desired property of the error terms according to 
the diagnostic tests of GMM models.  By construction, the lags of child mortality would be 
correlated with the error terms through time-invariant country-specific characteristics. Taking 
the first difference would not completely remove such simultaneity problem. Hence, we also 
instrument the dynamics of child mortality using its own lags starting from the second.  
There are two main points to note regarding the GMM estimation. First, the number of 
instruments is quadratic in the time dimension T, and finite samples may lack of adequate 
information to well estimate the elements of the variance matrix when many instruments are 
used.9 Moreover, the Sargan/Hansen over-identifying restrictions could be weakened and 
generate a p-value equal to 1.10 0LQGIXORIWKH³UXOHRIWKXPE´of not letting the number of 
instruments exceed the number of cross-sectional units,11 we estimate models that instrument 
with one lag only (lag 2) and thus keep the number of instruments below the number of 
countries. We then check the robustness of our findings by estimating models that instrument 
with two lags (lag 2 and lag 3) and thus use more information. Consistency across the two sets 
of results strengthens our confidence in them. The second point worth noting is that the 
DV\PSWRWLFRIWKH*00PRGHOLVEDVHGRQWKH³ODUJH1DQGVPDOO7´DVVXPSWLRQ2XUGDWDVHW
contains 110 countries, which LVQRWH[DFWO\³ODUJH´ZKHQLWLVcompared to the time span of 21 
years. This limitation should be kept in mind while interpreting the results.     
 
                                                 
9
 Roodman (2009). 
10
 Andersen and Sørensen (1996). 
11
 Kimura, Mori, and Sawada (2012); Roodman (2009). 
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Web-Appendix 7. Degree centrality 
 
As noted in the main text, closeness centrality is the SNA concept that has the closest fit with 
the mechanisms highlighted in our argument. It may nonetheless be useful to compare the effect 
of closeness centrality with the effect of degree centrality, which has been discussed in Web-
Appendix 2 and which considers only direct links. Table A4 shows that the correlation between 
the degree and closeness measures is quite high and Table A6 shows that the beneficial effect 
of centrality persists when closeness is replaced by degree.  
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Table A6. Estimated effect of degree and closeness centrality in the health aid network on 
under-5 mortality, 1990±2010. GMM models instrumenting with one lag (lag 2). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  -0.021** 
   
-0.013* 
 
(0.009) 
   
(0.007) 
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  
 
-0.003** 
   
  
(0.001) 
   
&ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
  
-0.006*** 
  
   
(0.002) 
  
&ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
   
-0.004** 
 
    
(0.002) 
 'HJUHH FHQWUDOLW\ Į  *'3
per capita 
    
-0.001 
     
(0.005) 
GDP per capita -0.087** -0.114*** -0.145*** -0.114*** -0.058* 
 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.044) (0.034) (0.033) 
Health aid per capita -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) 
Trade (as % of GDP) -0.014 -0.018 -0.021 -0.019 -0.017 
 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.011) 
Urbanisation 0.045 0.057 0.045 0.052 0.099 
 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.050) (0.039) (0.075) 
Partial democracy -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Full democracy -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Political violence 0.005* 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Lag 1 of under-5 mortality 0.583*** 0.627*** 0.611*** 0.684*** 0.733*** 
 
(0.175) (0.159) (0.174) (0.159) (0.175) 
Lag 2 of under-5 mortality 0.261 0.209 0.188 0.173 0.135 
 
(0.162) (0.150) (0.156) (0.151) (0.163) 
      
Country-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No. of observations 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 
No. of groups 102 102 102 102 102 
No. of instruments 95 95 95 95 113 
AR(1) -1.225 -1.257 -1.260 -1.340 -1.315 
AR(1) p value 0.221 0.209 0.208 0.180 0.189 
AR(2) -0.030 0.275 0.342 0.506 0.665 
AR(2) p value 0.976 0.783 0.733 0.613 0.506 
Hansen stat 56.10 61.37 76.25 64.92 66.12 
Hansen p value 0.826 0.671 0.205 0.549 0.925 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Web-Appendix 8. Robustness check with two lags 
 
For the reasons stated in Web-Appendix 4, as a robustness check we re-estimated each model 
using two lags (lag 2 and 3). The results are presented in Table A7 and are consistent with the 
results reported in the main text. The robustness of the findings across the two instrumentation 
choices increases our confidence in them. 
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Table A7. Estimated effect of centrality in the health aid network on under-5 mortality, 1990±
2010. GMM models instrumenting with two lags (lag 2 and 3). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  -0.020*** 
   
 
(0.006) 
   
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  
 
-0.004*** 
  
  
(0.001) 
  
&ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
  
-0.007*** 
 
   
(0.002) 
 
&ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
   
-0.006** 
    
(0.003) 
GDP per capita -0.057*** -0.069* -0.075** -0.067*** 
 
(0.021) (0.038) (0.034) (0.022) 
Health aid per capita -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trade (as % of GDP) -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.012 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) 
Urbanisation 0.083 0.046 0.027 0.037 
 
(0.078) (0.063) (0.080) (0.086) 
Partial democracy -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Full democracy -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Political violence 0.005* 0.004 0.004* 0.005* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Lag 1 of under-5 mortality 0.553*** 0.544*** 0.550*** 0.558*** 
 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.048) (0.045) 
Lag 2 of under-5 mortality 0.309*** 0.319*** 0.321*** 0.333*** 
 
(0.044) (0.030) (0.036) (0.038) 
     
Country-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
No. of observations 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 
No. of groups 102 102 102 102 
No. of instruments 167 167 167 167 
AR(1) -1.437 -1.419 -1.421 -1.397 
AR(1) p value 0.151 0.156 0.155 0.163 
AR(2) -0.660 -0.874 -0.836 -0.902 
AR(2) p value 0.509 0.382 0.403 0.367 
Hansen stat 67.75 78.60 78.07 76.17 
Hansen p value 1 1 1 1 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Web-Appendix 9. State capacity as moderating variable 
 
It is possible that governments do not benefit equally from the information flowing through the 
aid network. Two contrasting expectations can be formulated. On the one hand, management 
research on knowledge networks indicates that units with little absorptive capacity do not 
necessarily benefit from network centrality, since the cost of maintaining numerous links can 
exceed their benefits in terms of knowledge acquisition.12 A similar effect is possible in the 
domain of health policy. For instance, Beesley, Cometto and Pavignani report that, when an 
international and multi-agency team co-ordinated by WHO produced a costly large-scale 
survey of human resources working in the health sector in southern Sudan and formulated 
recommendations, the Ministry of Health failed to make use of the findings and 
recommendations in developing a human resource plan. According to former members of the 
consultant team, ³the institutional environment of the Ministry of Health was not ready to 
absorb and use the findings of a large scale (or, perhaps, any) survey´.13 In his study on the 
adoption of eHealth legislation, Lang finds that private-public partnerships lead to more 
legislation through knowledge transfer in countries that have relatively high level of 
government capacity in the health sector.14  
On the other hand, is also possible that the knowledge benefits of centrality are higher in 
countries with weaker domestic state capacity, since the ability to tap into global information 
                                                 
12
 Tsai (2001). 
13
 Beesley, Cometto, and Pavignani (2011, 6).  
14
 Lang (2014). 
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flows allows policy-makers to offset the scarcity of endogenous knowledge creation and 
evaluation.  
These two expectations suggest that network centrality and domestic state capacity can be 
complements as well as substitutes. Since both high-capacity and low-capacity government 
units may benefit from network centrality, although for slightly different reasons, we check 
whether the effect of network centrality is moderated by the level of state capacity. To do so, 
we estimate models with an interaction term between each of our centrality measures and four 
commonly used indicators for state capacity: GDP per capita, the Bureaucracy Quality score 
of the International Country Risk Guide, and two variables from the Relative Political 
Performance Data Set: Relative Political Extraction, which gauges the ability of governments 
to appropriate portions of the national output, and Relative Political Reach, which gauges their 
capacity to mobilize populations under their control. 15 
The interaction terms between centrality and our various measures of state capacity (GDP 
per capita, Bureaucracy Quality, Relative Political Extraction and Relative Political Reach) are 
generally not statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the benefits of 
network centrality are not conditional on the state capacity of recipient countries.16 Table A6 
only shows the interaction between one centrality measure (degree centrality with Į DQG
one measure of state capacity (GDP per capita), but other combinations of centrality and state 
capacity measures lack statistical significance as well. The exception is the interaction term 
                                                 
15
 Kugler and Tammen (2012); PRS Group (2010). 
16
 Kam and Franzese (2007, 49). In Model 5 of Table A6 only, the Centrality and GDP per capita variables are 
centred on their sample means in order to facilitate substantive interpretation, as recommended by Kam and 
)UDQ]HVHWKHFRHIILFLHQWIRU&HQWUDOLW\LQGLFDWHVWKHYDULDEOH¶VHIIHFWZKHQ*'3SHUFDSLWa is at its sample 
mean rather than at the substantively meaningless value of 0. The interaction term is statistically insignificant 
regardless of whether the variables are centred or uncentred.  
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between FORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į DQGRelative Political Reach, which is significant at the p 
< .10 level.  
 
Web-Appendix 10. The role of donor coordination 
 
We checked if our results hold if we exclude health aid that is highly coordinated among 
multiple donors. It could be argued that centrality may have beneficial effects when donors 
coordinate their efforts and detrimental effects if they fail to coordinate or are in a competitive 
relationship with one another. Donor coordination is a multidimensional phenomenon, which 
is difficult to quantify for the purposes of cross-national analyses. A proxy measure of 
FRRUGLQDWLRQ DPRQJ GRQRUV LV VXSSRUW JLYHQ D UHFLSLHQW FRXQWU\¶V health-sector budget, for 
instance in the context of a sector-wide approach (SWAP) in health, as opposed to funding 
directed towards specific projects or addressing specific diseases. Table A8 shows the 
percentage of global DAH given to health sector programme support, which is broken down 
by channel (bilateral, multilateral, private).17 We also break down the percentages by period, 
before and after the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, by which donors committed 
themselves to increasing the coordination of their aid. As shown in the table, only a small 
percentage of DAH is directed towards health sector support, but it increased in the years after 
the Paris Declaration. 
   
  
                                                 
17
 Data on disbursements for health sector program support come from Ravishankar et al. 
(2009). 
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Table A8. Percentage of global DAH given to health sector programme support 
 
  Bilateral DAH Multilateral DAH Private DAH 
1990 - 2010 6.35% 2.30% 0% 
1990 - 2004 2.35% 1.04% 0% 
2005 - 2010 9.48% 3.45% 0% 
 
To assess whether the effect of centrality depends on donor coordination, we test whether 
network centrality continues to have a negative and statistically impact on child mortality after 
disbursements for health sector program support (our proxy for coordinated aid) are subtracted 
from the total flows of health aid. Table A9 shows the results. We find that the effects of 
centrality in the health aid network excluding coordinated aid are very similar to those of the 
overall health aid network. This suggests that the beneficial effect of health aid network 
centrality does not depend on high levels of coordination among donors. 
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Table A9. Estimated effect of centrality in the health aid network (uncoordinated aid only) on 
under-5 mortality, 1990±2010. GMM models instrumenting with one lag. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  -0.021** 
   
 
(0.009) 
   
'HJUHHFHQWUDOLW\Į  
 
-0.003** 
  
  
(0.001) 
  
Closeness ceQWUDOLW\Į  
  
-0.006*** 
 
   
(0.002) 
 
&ORVHQHVVFHQWUDOLW\Į  
   
-0.004** 
    
(0.002) 
GDP per capita -0.089** -0.113*** -0.145*** -0.109*** 
 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.044) (0.034) 
Health aid per capita -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Trade (as % of GDP) -0.014 -0.018 -0.021 -0.019 
 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) 
Urbanisation 0.046 0.057 0.045 0.051 
 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.050) (0.040) 
Partial democracy -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Full democracy -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Political violence 0.005* 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Lag 1 of under-5 mortality 0.584*** 0.630*** 0.612*** 0.692*** 
 
(0.175) (0.158) (0.174) (0.157) 
Lag 2 of under-5 mortality 0.259 0.208 0.188 0.169 
 
(0.164) (0.150) (0.156) (0.151) 
     
Country-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
No. of observations 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 
No. of groups 102 102 102 102 
No. of instruments 95 95 95 95 
AR(1) -1.231 -1.263 -1.263 -1.351 
AR(1) p value 0.218 0.207 0.207 0.177 
AR(2) -0.020 0.287 0.347 0.532 
AR(2) p value 0.984 0.774 0.729 0.595 
Hansen stat 56.26 62.71 76.37 63.72 
Hansen p value 0.822 0.626 0.203 0.591 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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